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Abstract
The War for Independence brought about popular mobilization in northern 
Argentina. As the war was waged in the provinces of Salta and Jujuy, rural 
population enlisted in militia battalions since 1814. Militia regulations 
in the Rio de la Plata area called for the extension of military jurisdiction 
(fuero) to all soldiers as well as for compensation when mobilized for 
combat. Popular mobilization in Northern Rio de la Plata posed a threat to 
elite power as it challenged long-held hierarchies and patterns of social 
deference dating from colonial times. Actions such as intimidation, seizure 
of livestock, and land occupations were commonly taken by gauchos and 
regarded by them as acts of social justice. The elite regarded them as 
arrogant and violent acts aimed at curtailing their power and strip them 
from their property and power. 
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In his memoirs, written in exile in the 1840s, General José María Paz, 
a military hero of the independence war described the political system 
imposed by militia commander Martín Güemes in the northern provinces of 
the Río de la Plata as follows,
Everyone knows that this caudillo, getting his support exclusively from the plebe 
and gauchos of the rural areas, had made enemies of the other superior classes 
of society.1
This brief paragraph sheds light on the Salta and Jujuy urban elites’ 
deepest dilemma: the challenge to their power by popular mobilization. The 
cabildo of Salta elected Güemes governor of the province in 1815 hoping 
that he would lead a victorious campaign against the Spaniards. This Güemes 
did, but he also inaugurated a political regime that posed a threat to the very 
survival of the elite that had elected him. Since 1814, the course of the war 
forced the elite to tolerate popular mobilization needed to stop the Spanish 
frequente invasions. But mobilization, in turn, transformed the rural popula-
tion into a powerful political tool against elite government.2
The key to understand the elite’s conundrum is the relationship 
established between Güemes and his rural following. Güemes built up his 
power by offering protection to the rural population who became his sup-
porters.3 Güemes extended his protection applying legislation that granted 
militia men the full rights of “fuero militar” (military jurisdiction), thus 
excluding them from the jurisdiction of civil authorities. This was a major 
blow to the cabildos of both Salta and Jujuy who hitherto had exerted 
their unchallenged authority over both city and country people. Also 
Güemes offered his men compensation for military service. He resorted to 
the radical --subversive for the elite-- measure of suspending the collec-
tion of rent from tenants enrolled in militia regiments. This hit the elite at 
the core of their economy: with the decline of trade with Upper Peru due 
to the war, agriculture and tenancy were their two only remaining profit-
able sources of income. 
Thus Güemes broke up old, colonial bonds between landlord and 
peasant based on tenancy and peonage and inaugurated a new brand of 
loyalty between caudillo and rural population that challenged elite domi-
nation.4 To this Güemes added the unmistakable appeal of a charismatic 
personality: he was worshipped by his followers who considered him a 
father-like figure.5
Who were the Gauchos?
In the last thirty years historians of rural life of late colonial and 
early independent Río de la Plata have challenged the image hitherto held 
true of a countryside inhabited by gauchos roaming the extended pam-
pas in search of occasional and unstable work in large cattle ranches. By 
putting their finger on the issue of agrarian production and labor, these 
historians have conveyed a picture of the Buenos Aires countryside --and 
to a certain extent of all the littoral provinces-- inhabited by small agri-
cultural producers whom they call “peasants.” In this renovated depiction 
of the rural areas, the gaucho in the traditional sense of the word seems to 
have had a marginal presence in the pampas.6
But in Argentina there were other gauchos: those who fought a 
fierce “guerra gaucha” against the Spaniards in Salta and Jujuy. Previous 
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to the revolutionary period the name “gaucho” had never been heard in 
these Northern provinces. Whenever the local authorities refer to the rural 
population they called them “paisanos,” “labradores,” or more generally 
“habitantes de la campaña.”7
The first mention of the term “gaucho” dates from February 1814. 
General José de San Martín, Commander in Chief of the Army of the North, 
informed the central government in Buenos Aires that the “gauchos” of 
Salta were waging a war of resources against the invading Spaniards. 
When the official newspaper La Gaceta Ministerial published the piece in 
April, its editors substituted “brave peasant patriots” for “gauchos” because 
it was afraid of the negative impact of the term on its porteño (i.e. Bue-
nos Aires) readers.8 In fact, according to Emilio Coni, in Buenos Aires, the 
littoral provinces, and Banda Oriental, “gaucho” had a twofold meaning: 
one restricted to rural people of unknown occupation or criminals, and the 
other one encompassing all the inhabitants of the countryside.9
The name “gaucho” started to become common in Salta and Jujuy 
during the second Spanish invasion in 1814. In October 1814 the cabildo 
of Salta informed the Director Supremo of the recent disastrous defeats 
of the revolutionary Army in Upper Peru. The Army of the North was in 
complete disarray and was unprepared to defend Salta and Jujuy from the 
impending invasion of the Spanish Army. Both provinces would have been 
doomed if the rural population had not reacted as they did. In a very tell-
ing statement the cabildo of Salta praised the “citizens of the countryside” 
as they took up arms against the Spaniards,
Strange prodigy! A sole spirit encouraged all these peoples, who we did not deem 
enlightened enough to make such a general, magnanimous, and heroic decision. It 
is well known that the only riches these miserable people had were a short number 
of cattle and horses. Ready to wage war, with no weapons besides their own arms, 
there has not been a single man who has not enlisted as a volunteer soldier, who 
served under the name of Gauchos. As they were not regular soldiers, since they took 
sides they became aware of the perils of war and neglected their own existence, and 
even the means to keep their affairs and homes.10
The cabildo had to clarify the meaning of the word “gaucho” in its 
statement, as the term was new to the language of the district: Gaucho 
meant rural people of short material means who rose up in arms volun-
tarily and enlisted as informal soldiers.
During the Spanish occupation of Salta and Jujuy in the first half of 
1814, the Spaniards frequent raids into the countryside to seize forage and 
food prompted rural mobilization. The Spanish troops stationed in both cit-
ies occupied neighboring haciendas and ransacked others. Restricted to the 
landowners’ assets at first, the Spaniards’ pillage did not spare the rural 
poor. Dámaso de Uriburu, eyewitness to these events, wrote in his memoirs 
that Spanish Commander General Joaquín de la Pezuela 
extended proscription, pillage, and death to the mass of the population of the 
countryside, who hitherto had been only spectators not in the least interested in the 
war...harassed and treated cruelly without motive, they resolved to rise up en mass 
to defend their lives and belongings, so unfairly and pointlessly threatened.11
Mobilization of the rural poor was both spontaneous and orga-
nized. In the first case, groups of peasants voluntarily formed squadrons 
and elected their leaders. Dámaso de Uriburu mentions several skirmishes 
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among such groups and the Spaniards in the vicinity of Salta. On one such 
occasion, the people were celebrating carnival when were suddenly at-
tacked by the Spaniards. Summoned by a “curandero” (folk-healer), a man 
of high prestige in the locality, they grabbed clubs, ploughs and other tools 
and fought back.12 In the second case, the landowners organized rural mo-
bilization. As a response to the pillaging by Spanish troops, several “hacen-
dados” recruited their tenants and peones and formed militia battalions.13 
When General San Martín put Güemes in charge of the rural militia 
of Salta and Jujuy popular mobilization had already started to organize. 
Güemes’ main task was to expand and discipline the troops. He managed 
to extend militia recruitment to every corner of the province by drawing 
into this process more landowners and also minor rural officers such as 
post-masters. By 1815, when he was elected Governor, he already was the 
chief of a force of some 3,000 soldiers.
Güemes favored the use of the term “gaucho” to refer to the rural 
militia. The gaucho was, from then on, a peasant turned soldier. According 
to Spanish General Andrés García Camba the gauchos
[W]ere country folk, good riders armed with machete, saber, musket or rifle, which 
they used, mounted on their horses with unsurpassed skill. They approached the 
enemies with surprising confidence, ease, and in such cold blood as to amaze the 
European officers that saw these extraordinary horsemen for the first time, whose 
unmatched talents for guerrilla warfare they repeatedly tested.14 
Gauchos were compared to the Cossacks and Mamelucs in their 
outstanding riding skills. As García Camba put it (with a little exaggera-
tion) “these horsemen need not dismount to undress a corpse or to grab a 
silver coin from the ground.” Güemes was also said to be a “most excellent 
gaucho, a great horseman.”15
Gauchos also achieved a strong reputation -- among both friends 
and foes of the revolutionary cause-- for being consummate practitioners 
of guerrilla warfare. They knew that in open battle against better armed 
Spanish troops they were doomed. Thus, they resorted to torturing the 
Spaniards with sudden skirmishes in the middle of the night held in loca-
tions in the countryside suitable to this hit-and-run strategy. The gauchos 
were masters at hiding themselves from the Spanish troops until they got 
close to them and attack them ferociously. Besieged within the confines of 
the cities of Salta and Jujuy, the Spaniards found it extremely difficult to 
venture out to get food and forage. Every time they did they were system-
atically harassed by the gauchos.16
Salta and Jujuy owed to the gauchos’ “war of enthusiasm,” as 
General Paz called it, their victory over the Spanish Army in mid 1814. Paz 
recalls in his memoirs that victory gave the gauchos a measure of their 
military might and a sense of pride. He also pointed what he considered 
the gauchos’ most negative traits: they were unruly, undisciplined and ar-
rogant. Once, he censured a fellow officer for yelling telling him that “we 
[the military] are not gauchos, we do not yell.” 17
Thus, by the end of the second Spanish invasion in mid 1814, “gau-
cho” was an established term in the vocabulary in the Northern provinces 
of the Río de la Plata. 
Who were these rural poor turned into soldiers? The few available 
contemporary sources helpful to estimate the size of the gaucho militia 
are military rolls, which merely contain names, ranks, and attendance. Only 
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in 1826, when the militia was reorganized the provincial government took 
more complete military censuses.18
In 1826 gauchos encompassed roughly ten per cent of the total 
population of the province. As one of the main goals of the provincial 
government’s reorganization of the militia in 1826 was to reduce its size, 
its number and ratio to the total population must have been larger dur-
ing the war of independence. Almost three quarters of the gauchos were 
between 20 and 35 years of age, and two thirds of them were married and 
were likely to have families. Only one military census (León, an agricultural 
district located immediately north of the city of Jujuy) recorded gauchos’ 
ethnicity and occupation. All of the sixty eight men enlisted there were 
“natives,” that is to say Indians and all of them but one were “labradores,” 
or agricultural workers. Except for one who lived on his own land, all of 
them lived in haciendas owned by members of elite families of Jujuy. A 
large majority of the gauchos of León were born within the province, most 
of them in districts nearby, and only twenty of them were foreign born in 
neighboring Upper Peru and Peru.19
Thus, gauchos were adult men living in haciendas, the majority of 
whom were married and had families. Their working conditions in the 
haciendas varied from district to district, but the information on these 
arrangements is very scarce. In the haciendas of Salta and Jujuy, however, 
tenancy and peonage were the most common labor arrangements between 
landlords and peasants since at least the eighteenth century.20
In Jujuy and Salta tenancy (called “arriendo y obligaciones”) involved 
mutual obligations between landlord and tenant. Tenants used to pay the 
landowner a fixed amount of money a year, usually between six and twelve 
pesos, depending on the size of the plots assigned. In addition to this, 
they had to work for the hacienda two weeks a year tending the landlord’s 
livestock, branding cattle or shoeing horses. Sometimes the landowner 
provided the tenant with seeds, agricultural tools (a plough, for instance), 
and oxen, and collected the rent in kind (i.e. a share of the crop) instead of 
in money.21
The relationship between tenants and landowners involved many 
more complex transactions than the mere payment and collection of rent. 
It also included trade and credit relations. For tenants and peasants in 
general, the landowners’ (and merchants’) shops in town were a source of 
goods purchased on credit, while for the merchants and landowners the 
supply of credit to the peasants was another way to put their hands on the 
agricultural surplus, besides the collection of rent.22 
Many judicial cases held in the local archives reveal the intricate 
web of social and economic relationships established among peasants and 
the powerful within the local society. These documents also expose the 
complex social meaning imbedded in the word “gaucho” in the countryside 
of Jujuy and Salta. If only a few of the gauchos owned land, it is apparent 
that the upper echelons of them owned livestock. They were also able to 
participate in commercial activities, and in some cases were key employ-
ees within the structure of a hacienda.23 These cases, of course, are not a 
representative sample of the local rural society as they do not include the 
poorest tenants and peons who did not file any suit. 
To sum up: in Salta and Jujuy, gauchos were men of the countryside 
of scarce material means, at least to the eyes of the elite. Landless people, 
they were either peons or tenants on the estates of the elite paying rent 
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and/or working for the landowners. Sometimes engaged in commercial ac-
tivities, some of them also owned livestock. The word had an unmistakable 
military connotation: gauchos were horsemen enlisted in the militia.
Caudillo and Gauchos: Protection and Compensation
[I want] to thank you a million times for your constant and distinguished services... 
Please extend my most sincere gratitude to all of the worthy officers who have 
excelled along with you, especially to Lieutenant Ximenes of whom I have the best 
references...let him rest assured that I take him under my protection; I will reward 
him and the others like him according to their services.24
Protection and compensation are key factors to understand the bond 
established between Güemes and the gauchos. In his letter to Gaucho 
Commander Juan Francisco Pastor, chief of the militia of Huamahuaca (Ju-
juy), Güemes pledged to extend his protection to all the gauchos who were 
loyal to the cause of independence and to reward them.
Güemes established a direct relation between him and the gau-
chos by extending his protection over them and by giving them material 
compensation for their services. He extended military jurisdiction (fuero 
militar) to all of the gauchos enlisted in the militia by which they were 
placed beyond the jurisdiction of civil authorities. Güemes also declared 
the gauchos exempt from rent payment to their landlords while in service. 
His bond with the gauchos circumvented traditional ways of elite control 
of the peasants, such as cabildo jurisdiction over the countryside and the 
extraction of economic surplus via rent. By doing this Güemes enraged the 
elites of Jujuy and Salta, as he not only built up military regiments under 
his personal control but also stripped the elite of their political power and 
economic and social control over much of the rural population. As Dámaso 
de Uriburu, one of his most formidable opponents put it 
His [Güemes] ruling style corresponded exactly with an early plan he designed to 
establish an independent sovereignty in the province of Salta... [He] instilled in the 
irregular militia interests that were new and different from those of the community, 
and made it an obedient instrument for his plans.25
The question of extending military jurisdiction to the rural militia had 
colonial roots in Jujuy and Salta. As both cities bordered the Indian territo-
ry of Chaco, raising rural militia to defend the eastern frontier had always 
been a major concern. Throughout the eighteenth century colonial authori-
ties controlled the Indian frontier with professional military regiments, 
called “partidarios.” A force of some two hundred men, they were stationed 
in the several forts scattered along the frontier. Partidarios enjoyed full 
military jurisdiction, in both civil and criminal cases.26
Partidarios received the occasional help of militia recruited locally 
among the rural population in cases of Indian attacks. In such cases, the 
cabildo had the right to recruit rural population (around six hundred men), 
enlist them for one or two months, and assign them to guard the forts on the 
frontier while the partidarios were fighting the Indians. These arrangements 
were resisted by local landowners who complained that militia recruitment 
in times of harvest and sowing created a labor shortage on their haciendas.27
In 1801 Viceroy Marquis of Avilés enacted a “Reglamento” regulating 
the duties and rights of the militia while enlisted. Their main task was to 
24
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collaborate with the partidarios in the surveillance of the Indian frontier. 
The “Reglamento” created four militia cavalry squadrons in Salta and Jujuy, 
with 1,200 soldiers.28 Among its main clauses it included the militiamen’s 
right to enjoy full military jurisdiction and payment while enlisted.29 To 
appease the landowners a Royal Accord prohibited the recruitment of 
peasants in times of harvest.30
Military jurisdiction became one of the most polemical aspects of the 
recently created militia. The cabildos complained to the Intendents about 
the many instances of disorder created by the extension of the “military 
fuero” to the militiamen. They singled out the fact that militiamen were 
not forced to comply with cabildo ordinances or “bandos de buen gobi-
erno.” Shortly after the “Reglamento” was in place, the cabildo of Salta 
asked the Intendent to scale down the extent of military fuero to only the 
times when the militia were on actual service in the frontier. The Intendent 
refused to do so as he deemed the privileges granted by military fuero to 
be the only incentive for rural people to enlist in the militia. Even royal 
officers complained to the Viceroy that “fuero” prompted militiamen to be 
more unruly as it put them beyond the reach of ordinary justice. As future 
Intendent Arrigunaga put it in 1806, “fuero sounds in the ears of the mili-
tia man like independence from ordinary jurisdiction.”31 
When Güemes organized the Salta and Jujuy militia in 1814 he applied 
the existing late colonial legislation on the subject. Thus, militia men enjoyed 
military jurisdiction and were entitled to monetary compensation for their 
service. But the circumstances of the war of independence made the institu-
tion radically different from that of colonial times. First, most of the male ru-
ral population of the province was recruited into the militia after the second 
Spanish invasion of 1814, and second, the financial resources of the province 
were insufficient to cover the expenses generated by militia mobilization. 
At stake was not only the issue of the extension of fuero to every peasant 
enlisted in the militia but also the availability of rural workers in the hacien-
das. In fact, one of the major consequences of massive enlistment of gauchos 
since 1814-1815 was a sharp labor shortage in the countryside.32 
New legislation drafted by the central government in 1815 intro-
duced a major change in the organization of militia. The Provisional Stat-
ute recognized two types of militia, one provincial (“milicias provinciales”), 
another urban (“milicias cívicas”). The statute applied the viceregal “Regla-
mento” of 1801 to all of the aspects related to the provincial militia, but 
issued new legislation regarding the urban ones. They would be under the 
command of the cabildos, and only veteran soldiers enlisted would enjoy 
military jurisdiction.33
In August 1815 the cabildo of Jujuy met to revise the new statute 
issued in Buenos Aires. The revisions proposed included the provisions on 
militia. The cabildo objected to the application of the Reglamento of 1801 
to the militia recruited by Güemes to fight the Spaniards. The cabildo 
recommended a change of status for the militia that would define them as 
“cívicas” instead of “provinciales”. The militia thus defined would not enjoy 
military jurisdiction and would be under the cabildo’s control.34
In the midst of a political strife between Güemes and the cabildo of 
Jujuy (who resisted his election as governor by the cabildo of Salta without 
Jujuy’s participation), in early March 1816 the Commander of the urban 
militia of Jujuy reported to the cabildo that Güemes had summoned his 
company of cívicos thus disobeying the regulations on the matter included 
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in the 1815 Statute. Confronted by the cabildo on the issue, Güemes 
replied that he had decided to incorporate all the inhabitants of Jujuy, 
both city and countryside, into the gaucho militia “as a result of the high 
reputation the gauchos had achieved among the enemies, and to avoid any 
misconduct.” After a heated conflict between Güemes and the cabildo, the 
governor decided unilaterally to extend military jurisdiction to all the militia, 
urban and rural and put it under his sole command. Güemes fumed that
[N]owhere in the world were people from the countryside part of the urban militia; 
[I] decided that all of them should enlist in the heroic companies of the Gauchos, 
and that this arrangement will be forever.35
In 1817 a new Estatuto Provisional issued by the Congress confirmed 
the provisions on militia contained by former legislation.36 In Salta and 
Jujuy there were rumors that the new law had discontinued military juris-
diction for the gauchos. To stop the rumors, Güemes hastened to issue a 
decree confirming the inclusion of gauchos in fuero militar. He stated that
[A]ll the gauchos enlisted in their respective squadrons and troops enjoy and will 
for ever enjoy military fuero, and also whatever privileges the Supreme Government 
bestows upon them in gratitude and as reward.37
Soon afterwards, the head of the State, Director Supremo Juan Mar-
tín de Pueyrredón confirmed Güemes’ concession of military jurisdiction to 
the gauchos as it complied with the legislation on the matter, namely the 
“Reglamento of Militia” of 1801 and the Estatuto of 1817.38
As a result of the extension of military jurisdiction to all gauchos, a 
sizable part of the rural population of Salta and Jujuy achieved a privileged 
legal condition because of their participation in the war of independence. 
Being men enlisted in militia squadrons, gauchos were beyond the cabildos’ 
civil jurisdiction. As the cabildo of Salta so ably --and desperately-- put it
The current circumstances demand that any Americano should be a soldier, and 
perform his service whenever needed; but when he is not in service, he is a paisano, 
and so immediately subjected to civil jurisdiction. If this wise and prudent measure 
is not observed, let us do away with ordinary judges so that they do not become 
ghosts with jurisdiction but with no subjects to judge upon.39
In 1817, the elite of Salta and Jujuy received yet another blow from 
Güemes. According to the “Reglamento” of 1801 militia men were to be 
compensated for their services while mobilized. As the provincial treasury 
was exhausted by the efforts of a war that was waged increasingly paid for 
by local resources, Güemes decided to exempt the gauchos from the pay-
ment of rent to the landlords as compensation for their services. 
This controversial decision opened a new gap between Güemes and 
the urban elite of both Jujuy and Salta. The exemption of gauchos from 
rent payment hit the elite hard. As the war had halted trade with Upper 
Peru and Peru their sources of income were limited exclusively to their 
landed wealth. Dámaso de Uriburu described the situation as follows
Güemes proposed a sort of agrarian law by which he stripped the large majority 
of landowners of the province of their possessions as he exempted the gauchos 
from paying rent to the owners of the lands they occupied. So, these [the gauchos] 
became owners of almost all the territory of the province.
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Uriburu added that the gauchos “guided by a traditional loyalty to 
their old “patronos” “refused the privilege of exemption and kept on paying 
the rent.”40 Uriburu’s opinion notwithstanding much evidence points to the 
fact that gauchos did indeed stop paying rent to their landowners during 
Güemes’ tenure as governor.41 
The exemption from rent payment was a pressing issue for the 
landowners. Immediately after Güemes’ untimely death in mid-1821 they 
started to complain about it repeatedly to the provincial government. In 
1822 a newly elected governor, José Ignacio Gorriti ordered a thorough 
survey to settle the matter.
The government consulted the Commanders of the militia through-
out the province to determine whether Güemes had indeed exempted 
gauchos from rent payment or not. Of the ten Commanders who answered 
the survey, all but two (who were enemies of Güemes) agreed that the for-
mer governor had definitely granted the exemption to the gauchos. Some 
stated that he had exempted the gauchos only when they were effectively 
on duty; others, on the contrary, said that the exemption encompassed all 
gauchos at all times. Two of them very clearly pointed out that the dis-
tinction was negligible as the gauchos served year round because of the 
frequent clashes with the Spanish troops. 
Those who agreed about the fairness of the exemption justified it as 
a reward. Calling the gauchos “the arms of the Revolution and the war” of 
independence in Salta, Commander Juan Manuel Quirós, a close collabora-
tor of Güemes, asked
What arms have we used to accomplish these feats? Anyone who would not fail to 
show some gratitude must confess the Gauchos have had a very active role in the 
glories and triumphs of America... They are very poor in possessions, but very rich 
in merit.
Asked if the government should abolish the exemption, almost all of 
the Commanders strongly rejected the idea. According to them abolishing 
the exemption would only bring chaos in the rural areas because, as Com-
mander Francisco Velard reported, 
[i]f they [gauchos] are forced to pay rent it will terminate a privilege they hold as 
unquestionable justice.42
During his tenure as Governor, Güemes moved from a Commander 
of the provincial militia to a caudillo. He succeeded in mobilizing the 
rural masses of Salta and Jujuy to fight for independence. More than 
anything else, he succeeded in creating a powerful and fearsome militia 
of gauchos with whom he established a new type of bond, that between 
caudillo and follower. This new bond both superseded and replaced the 
traditional one between peasant and landlord based upon the elite’s 
monopoly of land ownership and credit. The protection Güemes granted 
the gauchos by extending fuero militar freed them from elite control by 
placing them beyond the jurisdiction of the cabildos. Also compensation 
to militia freed a large portion of the rural population from the centu-
ries-old demands of the elite, namely from payment of the rent. Thus, it 
is not surprising that the gauchos started to call Güemes “our protector,” 
and “father of the poor.”
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Challenging Elite Power
Between 1815 and 1821 the consolidation of Güemes’ power brought what 
to most members of the elite amounted to political persecution exercised 
at two levels. First, the exclusion of Güemes’ opponents from public office 
challenged elite’s power at its core, for they were barred from both the ca-
bildo and the city’s representation before Congress; second, the imposition 
of forced contributions and confiscation of property threatened the elite’s 
material survival.
The elite’s real threat however came from the actions of the gauchos. 
Writing in the mid-1830s as a political exile in neighboring Bolivia, Juan 
Ignacio Gorriti (a prominent priest and politician from Jujuy) reflected on 
gauchos’ challenge to elite property and authority in these alarming terms,
All the properties in the countryside, lands and livestock alike, were subjected to 
pillage. The vecinos would complain against the theft, violence, and plunder they 
suffered at the hands of the gauchos, but all in vain. Each [gaucho] commander was 
the absolute ruler of his district, and each [gaucho] soldier followed the example 
of his Chief... Stabbings and murders were committed with impunity. Everything 
was allowed provided that when the Spanish army invaded the Province they [the 
gauchos] would defend it.43
Beginning in 1815, the gauchos began to ransack the elite’s haci-
endas and seize cattle and horses. Güemes and the gaucho commanders 
deemed it just that the gauchos have access to the landowners’ livestock, 
seeing it as the elite’s small contribution to the independence cause 
contrasted with the gauchos risking their lives for it. The landowning elite 
were outraged at the loss of property. Although Patriot armies had lived on 
their lands since the beginning of the revolution, confiscation of livestock 
was resented for the militia commanders, unlike the regular Army officers, 
refused to give the landowners receipts for the animals seized. Timing also 
accounted for the elite’s rage. The decline of trade and the exemption of 
rent payment by the gauchos had made the elite rely even more heavily on 
their livestock for their sustenance.
Protected by military fuero, the gauchos entered the elite haciendas 
freely, and took livestock with them. Several landowners reported that 
gauchos’ “pillage” of cows and horses was fairly common in their lands.44 
Landowner Manuel Ignacio del Portal blamed Güemes for the ruin of his 
haciendas for he had authorized his Commanders and gauchos “to take 
anything they needed for the supply of the troops that defended this 
Province” without giving the landowner any receipt or even an account of 
whatever they took.45
If at the beginning the gauchos distinguished haciendas belonging 
to royalist from those belonging to patriots, the difference disappeared 
quickly. After a short time all haciendas became subjected to raids. More-
over, Güemes political opponents later claimed that the caudillo had his 
gauchos raid their haciendas with thorough fury simply because they op-
posed his politics. 
In 1816, when Bustamante left Jujuy to join the Congress of 
Tucumán as representative, he owned many livestock extant on his estate 
“El Brete”, one of the richest haciendas in the surroundings of Jujuy. Busta-
mante reminded the governor --by then the anti- Güemes General Antonio 
Alvarez de Arenales-- that the gauchos had entered the hacienda many 
times to seize cattle and horses and left it depleted of cattle.
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More than the goal of these exactions --namely, to support the gau-
chos who were fighting for independence-- Bustamante objected to the 
methods applied. He claimed that Güemes ordered the Gaucho command-
ers to enter the hacienda, get as many animals as they wanted, and leave. 
They did not bother to give the owner a receipt for the livestock, “neither 
did the landowners dare to ask for one, nor there was any order to give 
them any,” according to one witness. Bustamante argued that Güemes was 
particularly vicious with him and his family as they had staunchly opposed 
his election as governor of Salta, and kept opposing his policies ever since. 
He also recalled that the gauchos knew few limits in their actions: 
Those who have not forgotten the sad history of those wretched times should 
remember very well how disorderly, informal, and burdensome those exactions were. 
They would also remember the common fact that some landowners were forced to 
surrender their estates, leaving them under the direction of any Gaucho officer that 
would demand it. Everybody, even common soldiers, deemed to be authorized to 
force the owners out of their estates, without any further explanation or documents 
apart from the command and will of the Colonel, General, and Governor.46
Bustamante was speaking from personal experience. In fact, in 1816 
some gaucho tenants on his hacienda Rio Blanco brought him before the 
authorities for calumny. The gauchos reported to their military officers that 
Bustamante had made groundless accusations against them for stealing 
cattle and horses from his hacienda. He had also threatened to expel them 
from his property without any compensation for their crops. All the gau-
chos involved in the case agreed that Bustamante had treated them with 
contempt and rudeness. The main plaintiff, Sergeant Francisco Santa Ana 
relayed to the authorities that Bustamante had said to him, “[N]ow you 
believe you are Gods because you are Gauchos... You are eating the meat 
you steal, and riding horses you take away”. The other plaintiffs, gauchos 
Pedro and Raimundo Palala, and Raimundo Aramayo, all tenants of Busta-
mante on his hacienda, supported Santa Ana’s complaint. Aramayo added 
that Bustamante warned the gauchos that “times would change and then, 
where would the Gauchos and Commanders go?”47
This episode is is a fascinating example of the kind of challenge 
to elite power and social standing prompted by popular mobilization in 
northern Argentina. In fact, poor tenants’ bringing their landlord before the 
authorities was something unheard of before the revolution.
Land occupation seems to have been another form of gaucho 
action against the elite. In 1822 two landowners of Salta reported the 
governor that the gauchos on their haciendas had not paid rent for many 
years. The priest José Gabriel González de Hoyos, owner of hacienda Ale-
mania located on the mountainous area of Calchaquí valley to the west 
of the province informed Güemes in 1820 that the gauchos in his haci-
enda were not paying rent. Moreover, the gauchos had made his lands a 
gathering and grazing point for their livestock knowing that they would 
not have to pay any fee to the owner. Another landowner, the priest 
Juan Manuel Tejada complained about gauchos’ refusal to pay rent in 
his hacienda Cerrillos, two miles from Salta. Tejada had not collected the 
rent for six years, since 1816, and had witnessed the gauchos taking over 
the land piece by piece, so that “they have left me only the House, the 
Vineyard, and the Orchard.” As he put it, he was reduced to the status of 
nominal owner
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So far the Gauchos have become the legitimate and true owners of my lands leaving 
me only as a virtual possessor. They [have not paid] rent in work or money, nor they 
have given their master the least acknowledgement of his dominion.48
Although Tejada acknowledged that the gauchos should be compen-
sated for their sacrifices during the war, he still thought the landowners had 
the right to collect rent as they supported the gauchos materially. Thus he 
asked the government to order the gauchos to pay at least half of the annual 
rent of six to twelve pesos. But, even to determine how much each gaucho 
owed the landowner was an impossible task, as they had taken over so much 
land within his estate that he could not identify individual plots.49
Actions such as these probably occurred more frequently than they 
were documented. They reinforced the elite’s perception of the gauchos as 
outlaws protected by military power. The elite increasingly portrayed the 
gauchos as arrogant, insolent, and unruly. As landowner Miguel Antonio 
de Sarasívar put it in a letter he wrote in 1815 wrote to his fellow Julián 
Gregorio de Zegada 
all men [in the countryside of Jujuy]...call themselves Gauchos, and even the most 
ridiculous among them speak with more authority than a General.50 
Final Remarks
The War for Independence brought about massive rural mobilization to 
the northernmost provinces of Río de la Plata, Salta and Jujuy. Protected 
by the extension of military jurisdiction (fuero) and exempted from pay-
ing rent as compensation for their services gauchos posed a real threat 
to the power of the landowning elite. Arrogance, intimidation, seizure 
of livestock, and land occupations were actions commonly taken by 
the gauchos which had been unheard of before the war. These actions 
seem to have been the blueprint for new social relations that challenged 
long-held colonial hierarchies and deference. The gauchos considered the 
status thus acquired as a just recompense in return for their services in 
the war effort. The elite viewed these actions in a very different light. To 
them gauchos were arrogant rogues who committed the ultimate affront: 
to challenge elite power. Teodoro Sánchez de Bustamante expressed the 
elite’s view of Güemes and his gauchos by disdainfully calling the caudi-
llo’s regime “a disheveled administration.”51
Challenged at the core of their power, the beleaguered elite could 
only hope for the war to end and with it the dreaded reign of the gauchos.
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